Iraq today
Guest post by Bruno Mota
The thesis up front: I believe that the most important dynamic in Iraq today is not the fight between Americans and insurgents. It hasn’t been for a long time. For a while it was sectarian conflict, and it nearly destroyed the country. Although the latter dynamic remains significant, it is now secondary to the conflict between parties currently ‘inside’ the structures of power of the Iraqi state and those totally or partially outside who want in. How this tension is resolved will largely determine whether Iraq will move toward a decent outcome or return to civil war.
Insurgent attacks will probably continue for a long time (albeit at a much lower rate than before); but the insurgency has failed strategically and has been largely defeated tactically, and is no longer very significant. Some of the groups previously involved in it still have a significant role to play, but in a different context.
The Sunni nationalist insurgency’s strategic goal was to suppress the resurgent Shia, restore Sunni hegemony, and expel the Americans. The Sunnis lost the civil war to the Shia, no longer hope to rule Iraq alone, and increasingly turn toward the Americans for protection against the ‘Persians’. Most of them flipped sides or went home, with the remainder gravitating towards the Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, which incidentally shares the ideology but is only loosely associated with AQ itself).
AQI’s strategic goal went a bit beyond Iraq’s borders, and included inspiring an Afghan-style jihad to expel the Americans (thus making them useful allies to the Sunni nationalists), and leveraging this victory into turning the Sunni parts of Iraq into a proto-caliphate (the Islamic State of Iraq, declared in late 2006, which their erstwhile local allies were less keen on). AQI nearly succeeded when the Samarra bombing and other atrocities deliberately ignited a bloody ethnic war that nearly destroyed (or finished destroying) the country. Eventually, however, it lost too. Significantly, its defeat is due in large measure to the rejection, in Anbar and elsewhere, of its ideology by what was supposed to be its core constituency: conservative Sunni Arabs under American occupation.
Although totally opposed to the American presence, the heterogeneous Mehdi army (or Jaysh al Mahdi, JAM for short) was never primarily, or consistenly, a proper Shia insurgency. After staging two uprising in 2004, which the Americans put down after some hard (if lopsided) fighting, direct confrontations subsided. JAM insurgent activity was minor compared to attacks by Sunni groups until late 2007, which is also when the EFP started appearing in greater numbers. Indeed, most of JAM spent most of its time either ethnically cleansing Sunnis in eastern Baghdad or running various criminal enterprises, rather than fighting the US. Mind you, the Sadrists are extremely nationalistic and no friends of the Americans (their rank and file are also far more anti-Iranian than, say, Badr cadres). But it is a different dynamic from that of Sunni insurgents. First, JAM has more of a return address, or at least has arrestable public faces and some physical infrastructure. Second, they have a constituency which demands protection from AQI tender mercies and goodies from their patronage network. Thirdly, they are or were in the government.
The latter point is significant. After the Najaf uprisings, the Sadrists quickly realized that, while going against American firepower head-on was very efficient, martyrdom-wise, it got them nowhere on the material world. Instead, they concentrated on leveraging the Sadr name, and their nationalistic and anti-American credentials, into government positions, which they used for systematic plunder and to further their sectarian agendas (local police forces and the ministry of health being the most egregious examples), and for solidifying their patronage networks and/or criminal enterprises (selling Sunni property, black market petrol, ‘protection’, etc.). After the Samarra bombing, they joined the escalating civil war enthusiastically, protecting Shia civilians from Sunni death squad, and murdering or ethnically cleansing Sunni civilians.
The so-called ‘truce’ was called for several apparent reasons; for starters, the JAM leadership wanted to avoid clashing head on with the newly-surged Americans (bugging out to Iran didn’t enhance Muqtada’s reputation, though); but the fighting never stopped altogether. The American reaction to Sadr’s truce was a thing to behold, however. With evident insincerity, MNF-I (Multi National Forces - Iraq, aka the Coalition) spokesmen kept praising Sadr’s and JAM’s forbearance (even referring to him by the honorific ‘Sayed’ on occasion) in the most enthusiastic terms. Sadrist forces which kept fighting (with Iranian support, and possibly under Iranian rather than Muqtada’s control) were branded ‘outlaw’ and hunted down. It was a smart move by the Americans, as it allowed them to weaken JAM without appearing to be fighting against a nationalistic movement with wide popularity among poor Shia.
But perhaps more significantly, the truce also came after clashes with the Badr left dozens of dead in the holy cities. JAM was losing support even among its core supporters due to lawlessness and increasing criminal behavior. Muqtada wanted to reorganize JAM and turn it into a more disciplined force. By all accounts, he failed; what is left of JAM is more heterogeneous than ever, with some parts becoming wholly-owned Qods Force subsidiaries, others degenerating into pure thuggery. When the government forces (often just Badr-in-uniform, especially the National Police) moved into Basrah,Sadr City and even the staunchly Sadrist Maysan, many people were visibly glad to be rid of JAM.
Muqtada al Sadr was kingmaker for the past two Iraqi prime ministers (before Maliki, his votes helped Ibrahim Jaffari narrowly defeat the candidate preferred by both Abdel Aziz al-Hakim’s Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council [SIIC] and the Americans; in exchange, all charges against Sadrists relating to the murder of Abdul Majid al-Khoei upon his return to Najaf in 2003 were dropped). Up until a few months ago, despite his ‘occultation’ in Iran, Muqtada’s position seemed secure; but the central government has recently taken JAM head-on with increasing efficiency (more for the intersectarian benefit of the other Shia parties [Maliki’s own Dawa and Hakim’s SIIC] than for abstract republican ideals).
JAM is not beaten, but it has taken a beating. Unlike AQI, however, it still retains substantial popular support. As I will attempt to show, the most significant factor determining what happens next in Iraq is whether the Sadrists and the remains of the Sunni nationalistic insurgency, who are currently marginalized by the central government, can be brought back into something resembling a political and social compact.
For a decent outcome to happen, it is necessary that these outsiders be given enough of a stake, both in terms of government services (or, more realistically, patronage), and political participation. In that regard, the obduracy of the Maliki government (by dragging its feet on the hiring of Sunnis, or in providing them with governmental services) is probably one of the most worrisome (and intractable) problems in Iraq today.This is compounded by widespread corruption, and the absence of a competent civil service or a functioning civil society.
In the same vein, cracking down on the Sadrists’ criminal activities and parallel quasi-government is fine, even if the motives for such are less than noble; but to exclude them altogether (or to impose hurdles so severe they are effectively excluded) risks disenfranchising a large contingent of poor Shia. In fact, in the medium term, what Iraq needs more than almost anything else is an effective non-sectarian opposition. Such opposition would give voice and a measure of power to groups not currently represented in the ruling coalition, and would provide an incentive for the government du jour to at least try to do a competent job. There is evidence one such group might emerge, comprising Allawi’s secularists, some Sadrists, Jaffari’s Dawa splinter, and other odds and ends. But currently the insiders are far better organized.
Generally speaking, political progress in Iraq has lagged behind military progress, due largely to Maliki’s aforementioned obduracy. Still, lately there have been some hopeful if tentative developments; it is perhaps fair to say that the Iraqi parliament went from being paralyzed to being merely dysfunctional. And at least some of the tools in the hands of the Iraqi government are slowly becoming more effective (particularly the army, but also including a few ministries and a tentative judiciary). There is now at least the possibility of Iraqi solutions emerging within the Iraq political process (such as it is). In years past the Americans had considerable influence in Iraqi politics (and made a complete mess out of it), but currently political progress or lack thereof is largely in Iraqi hands, for better or worse.
Much will depend on the manner in which the upcoming provincial, and later national, elections are conducted. If popular groups or individuals are excluded, or if there is significant vote rigging or voter intimidation, the Sadrists and the various Awakening/Sons of Iraq/etc groups will probably abandon the political process altogether. A fair and well-run election on the other hand will bring into the political process these outsiders and sweep away many of the currently underperforming insiders. A blatantly rigged or eternally postponed election will probably push said outsiders back to a new insurgency, and will lead to either a resumption of the civil war or (more likely, in my view) the imposition of a Dawa/SIIC/Kurdish co-dictatorship.
Although the occupation is the backdrop for this situation, I believe the occupation and the insurgency are not the most significant things going on in Iraq at the moment. Although of course Iraqis almost universally dislike the American presence, according to the polls, ‘Ending the occupation’ is low on their list of priorities (they want security, services and jobs, mostly); a majority support an American withdrawal, but not an immediate one. The fact of the matter is that the gringo soldiers on the ground are not doing anything particularly nasty at the moment (unlike, say, AQI), so the Iraqis seem to tolerate them as long as they act as surrogate providers of that which the government can’t or won’t provide (security, services, jobs).
The ’surge’ (meaning not only an increase in troop level, but also a very welcome change in tactics), along with the application of proper counter-insurgency doctrine, accomplished a few good things, including significant security improvements. Without it, Iraq would probably have
continued its post-Samarra course into fragmentation and perpetual low-level ethnic warfare. It might still resume it.
In all of this, there is plenty the Americans (or, for that matter, the Iranians, should they be so inclined) can do (or refrain from doing) to improve the odds of a decent outcome; but the future of Iraq now lies increasingly in Iraqi hands.
There is a wealth of information and opinion on every aspect of the Iraq war floating around the internet. The sites listed below provide, in my idiosyncratic opinion, a reasonably wide variety of news, opinions and points of view by people who either are or where in Iraq, or have studied it extensively.
• Abu Muqawama is a collective blog “dedicated to following issues related to contemporary insurgencies as well as counterinsurgency tactics and strategy”. Not surprisingly, Iraq comes up a lot, usually in an insightful manner. I especially recommend the comment threads.
• Small Wars Journal is self-explanatory. More academic and less bloggy, it features interesting analyses and case studies about Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
• Abu Aardvark is Mark Lynch, an American academic who focuses on Iraq and the Arab media.
• Nir Rosen is a freelance writer who has taught himself Arabic, and has traveled extensively around Iraq, and has unequaled access to JAM members.
• Reidar Visser is a Norwegian academic who knows a great deal about the Shia and southern Iraq.
• Eye Raki is Haider al Khoei, who is the son of the murdered Abdul Majid al-Khoei (see above). He lives in London and has just returned from a visit to Iraq and Iran. As far as Shia clerical politics are concerned, you won’t find a better insider, unless Muqtada himself starts blogging.
• Talisman Gate is Nibras Kazimi, an unabashed neocon Iraqi exile. He is extremely well-informed, and his analyses are usually readable despite the thick ideological coloring. He has the annoying habit of launching wild tirades against commentators he doesn’t like.
• Missing Links’s author, one ‘Badger’ living in Canada, was separated from NK at birth, and now translates articles from the Arab media into English that portray the Americans as evil, bumbling or failing. He is sometimes informative, more often just plain annoying.
• Arabic Media Shack, which I just found out about (from a commentator on AM), is like Missing Links without the bile and conspirazoid silliness.
• The Long War Journal provides straightforward military analysis from a US military perspective. It avoid hooha-isms, but tends to report the US official line uncritically. It also compiles detailed Iraqi and Afghan orders of battle, and follows closely the progress of the listed units, down to battalion level.
Iraqi media doesn’t have a large English language presence, but you can check Aswat al Iraq or Azzaman, for instance.
Not much is happening in the Iraqi blogosphere; many of the best bloggers have left the country (and one, Blogiraq, was murdered). The Iraq Blogger Central provides a decent roundup of Iraq bloggers of all persuasions, punctuated by the occasional off-color comment.
There are plenty of American milblogs. Some just blabber inane hooha-ism, but there are plenty that are well-written and informative. A good roundup can be found at mudville. A couple of highlights: Army of Dude was in Iraq in 2006, and took part in the clearing of Baqubah in 2006 (Michael Yon was reporting on the same events from a different perspective). Check his archives for insight on combat from the ground level, and on the difficulties of working with the the former insurgents of the Sons of Iraq (nee 1920 Revolution Brigades). AoD is firmly against the war, which leads to some interesting (and surprisingly polite) comment threads. Acute Politics was part of an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team in Anbar around 2006/2007.
For some hard data, check Iraq Coalition Casualties, which tallies coalition and Iraqi deaths, along with a good up-to-date selection of news stories. Both the US Department of Defense and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) provide Congress with quarterly reports with lots of useful tables. Congress also has its own report-producing shop, the General Accountability Office. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy does something similar.
Well, this pretty much covers it. I hope that, whatever your opinions on the Iraq war are, you will find this list useful.
Comments
| 1 July 2008, 4:35 pm |
I would add Michael Totten and also Iraq Body Count to the list. IBC are anti-war but are scrupulous about their methodology, which is not only rare, but has also earned them the vitriol of Pilger and the Medialoons crowd:
| 1 July 2008, 4:40 pm |
+1 for Michael Totten.
| 1 July 2008, 5:19 pm |
This was a terrific and informative post. Thanks a lot.
| 1 July 2008, 5:20 pm |
Excellent post - glad to see the acronyms expanded!
I can’t comment on the factual accuracy of what you write, but your conclusion is essentially that the future of Iraq lies in large measure on the outcome and conduct of the up-coming elections. I think your argument is that if free elections are held, and what we might call extremist elements are allowed to participate, there is some chance that said elements will become more moderate, and use politics rather than violence. This sounds like a discussion we’ve had before in the context of Hamas in Palestine. It is surely highly unlikely that the American’s will allow such groups as AQI or Muqtada al-Sadr to participate in the election. And the prospect of anyone who is against the American’s becoming elected to power is surely unthinkable. If you accept this, we turn to your assertion that “the occupation and the insurgency are not the most significant things going on in Iraq at the moment.” Ok, maybe the fight between the occupation and the insurgency isn’t the main issue now, but what about the effect of the occupation on the institutions of government. Surely, under occupation the kind of elections you say are necessary to overt perpetual civil war are simply impossible. Would you agree with that?
| 1 July 2008, 5:21 pm |
that should read “avert” not “overt”.
| 1 July 2008, 5:29 pm |
“It is surely highly unlikely that the American’s will allow such groups as ….Muqtada al-Sadr to participate in the election.”
Did you actually read the article Irie?
| 1 July 2008, 5:33 pm |
“I can’t comment on the factual accuracy of what you write”
” Surely, under occupation the kind of elections you say are necessary to overt perpetual civil war are simply impossible”
well done Irie.
| 1 July 2008, 6:00 pm |
Truly, Irie, you completely and utterly missed the point of the article.
Sackcloth: thanks for the link, the assault on IBC is a fascinating story, no surprise to see loathsome propagandists like Pilger behind it. If this story hasn’t been covered by Harry’s yet it certainly should be.
| 1 July 2008, 6:25 pm |
Excellent post; very informative.
| 1 July 2008, 6:57 pm |
Why do you recommend a crackpot like Rosen? Do you think like him that the number of deaths in Iraq declined because there are fewer people to Kill?
| 1 July 2008, 8:54 pm |
Morgoth, Sackcloth, indeed Micheal Totten’s reports from Iraq and IBC’s scrupulous data aggregation are worth visiting.
Yaniv, I don’t agree with Rosen when he claims violence subsided because the ethnic cleansing is now complete. There are still some considerable intermingling in both Baghdad and Dyala; and if the killing only stopped for lack of victims, then we should expect violence against the refugees that have been trickling back. In fact, in the latest ABC pool most Iraqis who used to live in mixed areas claim said areas remain mixed. Still, Rosen has traveled extensivelly across the country; his considerable access to JAM gives us some important insights, even if his analyzes are a bit over the top (for more level-headed analyzes, read Visser.)
The Irie, thank you. The acronyms can indeed be a bit but off-putting. I tried to address some of your points from the previous thread.
About the participation of Sadrists in the elections: As it turns out, they have participated already; some have been elected to parliment, and as I said their votes were instrumental in the selection of both Jaffari and Malik. In the south they dominate the legislature in Maysan, and the governor of Basrah used to be from Fadhila (a sadrists splineter group: the revere Sadr senior (RIP), but don’t get along with the son).
I don’t think the Americans have now the wherewithal to bar sadrists from the upcoming elections. The Iraqi government, however might. Malik’s Dawa and the SIIC (which compete for the same shiia vote as Sadr’s guys, although they usually do well in different demographics) are probably tempted to sideline a rival, especially considering that, on governance and providing services to the population their record has been quite dismal.
Its parliament has passed legislation banning parties with militias from taking part. On principle it was a good thing (as was the breaking of Sadr’s paramilitary hold on Basrah, Sadr City and Amara); but it can be abused to bar sadrists/awakenings, which would be very bed. In response, Sadr seems to have formally dissolved the JAM, and his candidates will run as independents. Incidentally, the Badr corps (SIIC’s militia) has also been formally disbanded (which amounts to little more than a change in uniform, at least wrt the INP), and the Peshmerga has been absorbed into the Kurdish National Guard & the Iraqi Army.
One last point because I have to run: Some Sadrists (especially around Basrah) are milenarist lunatics (hint: the name JAM itself); others are a bit more sane. The ‘awakenings’ are probably as moderate as is feasible among sunnis, and are objectively far more pro-american than the sunni parties currently in parliment. Iwad Allawi is also among outsiders (and so is Chalabi, great chum of the Sadrists at the moment, incidently).
Stop….typing…things to do…
| 1 July 2008, 10:13 pm |
It is surely highly unlikely that the American’s will allow such groups as AQI or Muqtada al-Sadr to participate in the election.
This is surreal.
Yes, Irie, America is going to oppress Al Qaeda in Iraq by forbidding them from participating in the democratic process…
Meanwhile, in the real world, Sadr’s not only participated in elections, but has done so successfully.
The fact that your wrote the above is proof that you’re utterly ignorant about Iraq and, therefore, your opinions are false and worthless.
Next time you claim to care for the Iraqi people try bothering to learn the simple basics about their country.
And the prospect of anyone who is against the American’s becoming elected to power is surely unthinkable.
YOu’re so racist it’s beyond belief.
| 2 July 2008, 12:46 am |
Thanks for that - very informative. Excuse the ignorance - who or what are/is EFP?
I can’t help feeling though this was all a lost opportunity. This isn’t hindsight - I felt it very much as things were happening.
We should have:-
1. Had a proper curfew and security clampdown from day one.
2. Had a proper Provisional Government of Iraqis from day one. Only people who co-operated with the coalition would be given access to this.
3. We should have had proper licensing of political parties and movements.
4. Secured all the male population for screening.
5. Had full 24 hour monitoring of all clerics. They could only operate with coalition appointed liaison officers.
6. Guaranteed full employment for all those willing to support the Provisional Government.
7. Turned Iraq’s oil corporation into an enterprise owned by the people - shares to be distributed equally to all citizens.
So many missed opportunities! The administration put in the hands of someone who appeared to be a mental defective - Tommy Franks. Rumsfeld always backing the most stupid option! Torture being resorted to! Stupid, stupid, stupid.
| 2 July 2008, 2:14 am |
Bruno, I would be very weary of the Abu Muqawama blog. It is “defeatist” to its core, especially its commentators. They seem to be a bunch of CIA veterens and “realists” whose real concerns are how the US can tend to its longterm interests in Iraq, and manipulate the system including its nascent democracy to make the most for its interests.
SNLI a commentator declared that US should get into a strategic alliance with Muqtada Sadr to use him against the other Shias in a divide and rule strategy. The fact that Muqtada is conspiring to murder dissenters and the secular opposition and install a fascist religious velayat-faghih dictatorship, notwithstanding.
Abu Muqawama is the voice for these marginalized CIA types (realists and relativists) who are responsible for the Iraqi mishandling “quagmire”.
| 2 July 2008, 2:25 am |
Thanks, Bruno. Stunning post
| 2 July 2008, 8:43 am |
‘It is surely highly unlikely that the American’s will allow such groups as AQI or Muqtada al-Sadr to participate in the election.’
Absolutely Upminster - it’s way beyond Barking, it’s right at the end of the line.
The whole point about AQI is not that they do not do elections, as they regard them as ‘unIslamic’. This was one of the reasons why the Islamists and the Sunni Arab nationalists/ex-Baathists fell out after 2005, hence the ‘Sahwah’ movement in al-Anbar and elsewhere.
As for al-Sadr, the whole point about his movement is that (as Patrick Cockburn argues in his recent biography) he faces a choice between political participation and paramilitary activity - and the latter activity is fraught with danger because he has no control over significant parts of the militia (Jaish al-Mahdi) that ostensibly owes him allegiance.
‘the assault on IBC is a fascinating story, no surprise to see loathsome propagandists like Pilger behind it.’
I think there was something on this on HP. IBC - as far as I’m concerned - are an honourable bunch, and they obviously attracted Pilger’s rage by (1) not inflating casualty figures for the sake of it and (2) pointing out how many civilian deaths were caused by insurgent (sorry, ‘resistance’) atrocities.
It helps if you take your head out of your arse before you type, theHeilie.
| 2 July 2008, 9:44 am |
Here is an interesting discussion.
The Irie is played by Anas Al Tikriti
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQ0zrBBuBiw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shrpuRTsBWA&feature=related
| 2 July 2008, 1:15 pm |
field, EFP=Explosively Formed Penetrator, a slug of molten copper formed by explosives that can cut through any armour in use by the Americans (or anyone else). The most effective IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) make use of EFP; and are usually found in the hands of certain JAM elements. The Americans accuse Iran of supplying those weapons (which required some delicate machine tooling).
| 3 July 2008, 12:52 am |
Concerning Iraqi bloggers: Several good ones with varying points of view are Iraqi Mojo (a Shia Iraqi-American), Healing Iraq, Baghdad Treasure, Twenty-four Steps to Liberty and Iraq the Model. Googling their names should get you a link that you can click on and be connected with their blog.
| 3 July 2008, 12:55 am |
PS: Bruno, thank you for a an excellant post that is very interesting and informative.
| 3 July 2008, 2:32 am |
Interesting Bruno Mota. One important phenomenon that has been reported by many embedded and nonembedded reporters inside Iraq (including from the LWJ embedded in the ISF and its transition team advisors) is the large phenomenon of pro Muqtada and fiercely anti-JAM Iraqis. (The IA’s many Muqtada supporters fought tenaciously against JAM a few months ago.)
Many of Muqtada’s followers are also much less popular than their leader. In fact, recent reporting from Basrah suggest that Fadheela and Muqtada’s Sadrists will do very poorly if elections were help their today. Nasr is only one among many who believe this.
{This brings up another important point. In Iraq all politics is local. What we need much more of is analysis of local Iraqi politics by province and town.}
To bring the topic back to Muqtada, many of his supporters were brought into the provincial IP, INP and IA to co-opt Muqtada. Muqtada’s {IA supporters seem loyal to the chain of command.} Hakim gave up Badr because many of his supporters joined the ISF. Similarly, Muqtada now has this same option. Most Iraqis hope Muqtada takes up this offer.
I would also differ with you that PM Maliki intended a military campaign to disarm JAM. PM Maliki intended an Amara type operation and was surprised that JAM and other militias opened fire on the IA (when the IA tried to take possession of many buildings and locations.) But when “rogue” JAM and many non-JAM militias opened fire on the IA, PM Maliki ordered that all militias firing at the ISF be taken out. Dawa has no armed militia, and PM Maliki instinctively knew that most Iraqis backed the IA against all the militias that were attacking it. PM Maliki seized an opportunity when he saw it. PM Maliki demanded a major operation in Sadr city (when MNF-I and the IA wanted to wait longer before attacking Sadr city.)
Why did PM Maliki insist on this . . . at the risk of stretching the IA? Maliki understood that his Dawa faction would be strengthened with respect to Hakim and Badr if the IA won. {This has happened} PM Maliki was surprised by the degree of Sunni Arab and Kurdish support that he received as saw a chance to strengthen his personal popularity as a nonsectarian leader of Iraq {rather than be seen as a stake-holder inside the UIA.} This too has happened. Finally a clear victory for the IA would strengthen the power of the state (and it has.) Who controls the State? Who controls the IA? PM Maliki.
PM Maliki ordered the IA to do many things that the IA’s top generals, Gen Keane and Gen Cordesman saw as foolish . . . and the IA followed orders (after arguing with their commander in chief.) PM Maliki took risks and won. PM Maliki has proven that he has no qualms firing top IA generals, and now clearly trusts the IA.
At long last Iraq’s PM has a capable IA and INP that he trusts that can project power any where inside Iraq with great affect, supplying its own logistics and maintenance. At last, Iraq has a partially functioning and partially competent state, albeit with many dysfunctional and nonfunctional civilian ministries. The IA rank and file now respect and admire their commander in chief much more than they use to for supporting them and leading them to victory.
Recent ISF operations are very much about the rise of PM Maliki the individual as the leader of Iraq, although he privately couches it as a victory for the UIA to kiss up to Hakim.
I know this comment is getting long . . . but I will make it longer. :-) One consequence of Maliki’s policies has been the rise of the IA as a popular and respected nationalistic institution in Iraqi domestic politics. Notice how Muqtada and Iran now describe the IA in glowing terms (versus less positive terms back in the spring) Nasr, O’Hanlon, and Pollack now regard the rise of the IA in Iraqi politics as one of the greatest risks to Iraqi democracy. Because the IA is much more popular than Iraq’s elected politicians, this might get to the heads of the IA’s top (and increasingly popular) generals and cause them to over reach.
This subject needs to be explored much more in the international press than it has been up to now. Oh, how much I wish that we had a more intelligent global discourse on Iraq.
| 3 July 2008, 6:54 am |
Thanks to Bruno and Anand for their incisive analysis.
As Anand says, the major media and their poco leftist allies have little interest in the historic development of Iraq, unless they can pin blame for some unfortunate event on the US.
| 3 July 2008, 8:36 pm |
Hi Anand! I like the idea that Malik’s actions are more about strnghtening Dawa at the expense of SIIC, and not just boosting Dawa *and* SIIC at the expenase of the Sadrists.
Malik has indeed surprised me. He was universally regarded as timid and vacillating; but recently has been bold almost to the point of recklessness; and his bets have generally paid off.
Hamid, thanks. I’ve read AM almost since its inception. They are (with considerable overlap) a bunch of academics and former or serving US military. No Langley bylines, as far as I can tell. In nay case, I dispute your characterization of them as ‘defeatists’. There were times when they were perhaps too eager to emphasize apparent failures (e.g. the recent Basrah operations), but in general they are fair-minded and open to different ideas. SNLII (Soldier no longer in Iraq, a commentator who is practically a blog inside the blog) is ridiculously well-informed. He clearly dislike the Maliki government, and regards it as corrupt and incompetent. It is hard to deny he does have a point. But he is certainly no Sadr fan (note his comments on how they ran the ministry of health) .
| 6 July 2008, 7:32 am |
Bruno Mota–for those of you who do not know–is quite well informed about Iraq and the ISF.
For those of you interested in the ISF, please check out:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/iraqi_security_force_17.php
Every province in Iraq is now PIC or near PIC except for Baghdad, Salahadin (because the IA 49-12 has redeployed south to Amara and because the formation of the 14th IAD in Basrah was prioritized over the formation of the 12th IAD), Baghdad (far from PIC in my opinion), and Diyala.
Total violence inside Iraq is running perhaps 150 - 200 violent incidences a week. About 25 a day. The lowest level since February, 2004 . . . or possibly June, 2003. The total number of US casualties in June were 132, the lowest since June, 2003.
Several divisions in the Iraqi army as as good as any army divisions in any Arab country. {1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th IADs.}
Even 11th IAD performed amazingly well in the Sadr City operation, but requries substantial MNC-I back up.
| 9 August 2008, 2:41 am |
Excellent article, Bruno.
But this Raccoon reckons it’s not really about who is included in the elections and who isn’t.
Iraq - as a society - is trying to figure out whether they have a culture capable of normal existence as we know it. If they do, they’ll make it no matter what. If they don’t… well, they are in the right neighborhood for that.
I suspect they don’t. Sooner rather than later, they’ll deteriorate into some sort of a dictatorship; probably a number of dictatorships, unless Iran has its way.
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